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Case No. 930249-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELlANT JEFF CROSlAND 
APPELlATE COURT JURISDICTION 
This appeal was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court on August 26, 1993, 
and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue One: ·whether the trial court erred by holding that a person who executes 
a guaranty on behalf of a corporation in his representative capacity as an officer of the 
corporation, is personally liable for the guaranty when the guaranty was executed while 
the corporation was suspended, but before dissolution. 
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Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling is a question of law, thereby invoking 
a correction of error standard. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1993). 
Issue Two: Whether the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki's refusal to reconsider the 
Honorable Scott Daniel's order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland was an 
abuse of discretion, where Judge Daniel's order granting summary judgment was based 
upon application of the wrong version of the applicable statutory provision and was, 
therefore, an error of law. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365 
(Utah 1988). 
Issue Three: Whether the trial court erred by entering an award of damages 
against Jeff Crosland without a trial or .a summary judgment motion directed to the issue 
of damages. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1192. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1), (2)(d) (as amended March 10, 1987) IS the 
primary determinative statute in this matter, and provides as follows: 
(1) A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days 
after the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall 
be suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under 
Section 59-7-155, the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall 
mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, unless the corporation's 
certificate of incorporation is already suspended for any reason. 
(2) A notice of suspension shall state: 
2 
* * * * 
(d) that the corporation may remove the suspension by 
correcting the delinquency and paying a reinstatement fee 
determined by the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code pursuant to Subsection 63-38-3 (2), in addition to any 
fees required by Section 16-10-124, or, if its certificate of 
incorporation bas been suspended under Section 59-7-157; . 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 is also determinative in this matter, and provides as 
follows: 
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do 
shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or 
arising as a result thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1) (as amended March 8, 1990) is also relevant to 
this matter, but is not determinative inasmuch as the amendment was not in effect at the 
time of the events at issue in this matter. Section 16-10-88.2 (as amended March 8, 1990) 
provides: 
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days after 
the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be 
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under 
Section 59-7-155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the 
corporation, unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation is already 
suspended for any reason. A corporation that is suspended continues its 
corporate existence and may carry on any business so long as it also takes 
the necessary steps to remedy its suspended status and restore the 
corporation to good standing. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 16-10-88.2(1) (as amended March 20, 1990)(emphasis added-
reflecting the language added to the statute). 
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STA1EMENT OF 11IE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an action on a guaranty executed by defendant 
Crosland Industries, Inc. ("CI"). Having been unsuccessful in recovering from CI, 
appellants/cross-appellees seek to impose personal liability upon cross-appellant Jeff 
Crosland and other principals of Cl. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The amended complaint was filed 
on June 4, 1990. On March 26, 1991, the Honorable Scott Daniels, the trial judge then 
assigned to this case, granted summary judgment as to liability against Jeff Crosland. The 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki was subsequently assigned to this case and on November 13, 
1992, granted summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland. On November 20, 1992, Jeff 
Crosland filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment 
against him, which motion was denied by the trial court on February 18, 1993. 
On March 8, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed an objection to the judgment asserting, inter 
alia, that the judgment failed to establish damages against him and, absent a 
determination of damages, the judgment was not final. On March 9, 1993, without 
receiving any evidence to establish any basis for an amount of damages, the trial court 
entered judgment against Jeff Crosland in the amount of $72,978.46, together with interest 
in the amount of $26,816.58 and attorney fees. 
On March 18, 1993, plaintiffs/cross-appellees filed their notice of appeal, appealing 
the order granting summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland. 
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On March 19, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed a motion to amend judgment or grant new 
trial, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P., which motion was denied on May 25, 1993. 
Jeff Crosland filed his notice of appeal on May 28, 1993.1 
STA1EMENT OF FACfS 
1. Defendant Crosland Industries, Inc. ("CI") was lawfully incorporated on 
January 28, 1986, under the laws of the State of Utah and was issued a Certificate of 
Incorporation. (R. at 269). 
2. Defendant/cross-appellant Jeff Crosland ("Jeff Crosland") was the vice 
president and a director of CI. (R. at 210). 
3. On March 1, 1987, CI was suspended pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-
88.2. (R. at 210). 
4. On January 8, 1988, plaintiffs Brian and Shelly Murphy (the "Murphys") 
entered into a contract of purchase and sale with Arnold Swenson ("Swenson") by which 
Swenson agreed to purchase from the Murphys a business known as Granny's Buns, which 
was located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The agreed purchase price was $70,000. (R. at 210). 
1Jeff Crosland and the Murphys ftled separate appeals, which appeals were consolidated by 
the Utah Supreme Court and poured over to this Court on August 26, 1993. Although the issues 
raised in the separate appeals are, to a certain extent, related and overlap, Jeff Crosland is not an 
appellee with respect to the Murphys' appeal and, therefore, is not responding to the Murphys' 
Brief of Appellant. Rather, Jeff Crosland is solely a cross-appellant due to the consolidations and 
pour over. However, as per instructions received from the office of the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals, Jeff Crosland is submitting the instant brief under a red cover, although Jeff Crosland 
is a cross-appellant only, and not an appellee. 
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5. Swenson executed a promissory note (the "Note") in favor of the Murphys 
in the amount of $70,000.00 and a security agreement. (R. at 210). 
6. On January 8, 1988, CI executed a guaranty (the "Guaranty") of the Note. 
The Guaranty was executed by Jeff Crosland in his representative capacity as vice 
president of CI. (R. at 210). 
7. At the time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty on behalf of CI, Jeff 
Crosland was unaware that CI had been suspended by the State of Utah. (R. at 539:4-6). 
8. On March 1, 1988, CI was dissolved as a corporation. (R. at 210). 
9. Swenson subsequently defaulted on the Note and the purchase contract. (R. 
at 82). 
10. On July 27, 1989, the Murphys obtained a default judgment against CI based 
on the Guaranty in the amount of $72,987.46, plus interest at the rate of ten percent 
11. The Murphys commenced this action on February 27, 1988, and filed an 
amended complaint on June 11, 1988. (R.2, 45). 
12. On March 26, 1991, the Honorable Scott Daniels, the trial judge then 
assigned to this case, granted summary judgment in favor 1 ,; ' 1c 'Jphys and against Jeff 
Crosland based upon Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-88.2, 16-10-139 (as amended March 8, 
19901 (R. 178). 
13. On October 14, 1992, TrJdd Crosland l>'ir;n f,H sununary judgment 
as to each of the Murphys' causes of action. (R. 206-07). 
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14. A hearing on Todd Crosland's motion for summary judgment was held on 
November 5, 1993. (See R. at 531-53). At that hearing, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
expressly held that CI was a de jure corporation. Specifically, Judge Iwasaki stated: 
There seems to be no doubt this was a de jure corporation. This was not 
one in which the piercing of the corporate vail need be done. 
(R. at 549:14-16)(emphasis added). 
15. On November 13, 1992, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor 
of Todd Crosland. (R. at 314). 
16. On November 20, 1992, Jeff Crosland filed a motion for reconsideration of 
the order granting summary judgment against him. Similarly, on December 3, 1992, the 
Murphys sought reconsideration of the trial court's order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Todd Crosland. (R. at 332). 
17. A hearing on the motions for reconsideration was held on January 15, 1993. 
(See R. at 554-566). At that hearing, with respect to the apparent conflict between his 
order granting summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland and Judge Daniels' prior 
order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland, the trial court stated: 
... Either I'm right or Judge Daniels is right and it is going to be for the 
appellate court to decide .... But I am not going to reconsider Judge 
Daniels' previous order. That was done for whatever reason he wishes to 
state or he did state. His ruling will remain as will mine, although, 
apparently some conflict as to the two rulings. But as I indicated, the 
appellate court will decide that as to Mr. Mitchell's motion to reconsider. 
(R. at 563:22-564:8)( emphasis added). 
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18. The trial court refused to reconsider Judge Daniels' order granting summary 
judgment against Jeff Crosland (R. at 564), and denied the Murphys' motion to reconsider. 
(R. at 397). 
19. On March 8, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed an objection to the judgment 
asserting, inter alia, that the judgment failed to establish damages against him and, absent 
a determination of damages, the judgment was not final. (R. at 403). 
20. On March 9, 1993, without receiving any evidence to establish any basis for 
an amount of damages, the trial court entered judgment against Jeff Crosland in the 
amount of $72,978.46, together with interest in the amount of $26,816.58 and attorney 
fees. (R. at 49, 111). 
21. On March 18, 1993, the Murphys filed a notice of appeal as to the summary 
judgment in favor of Todd Crosland.2 (R. at 423). 
22. On March 19, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed a motion to amend the judgment or 
for new trial (R. at 425), which motion was denied on May 25, 1993. (R. at 464 ). Jeff 
Crosland filed his notice of appeal on May 28, 1993. (R. at 468). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Daniel's order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland is based 
upon the wrong version of the applicable statutes. Furthermore, the Honorable Glenn 
2Jeff Crosland notes that because the Murphys filed their notice of appeal before the trial 
court entered an order with respect to Jeff Crosland's motion to amend judgment or for new trial, 
the Murphys' notice of appeal is not valid and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Murphys' 
appeal. 
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K. Iwasaki has held that at the time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty, CI was a de 
jure corporation. Under Utah law, a corporate principal is not liable for the debts and 
obligations of a de jure corporation and, therefore, Jeff Crosland cannot be held 
individually liable for the guaranty which he executed solely in his representative capacity 
as vice president of CI. 
Despite the fact that Judge Daniels' order granting summary judgment against Jeff 
Crosland is based on the wrong version of the applicable statute, and despite the fact that 
Judge Iwasaki recognized the conflicting nature of the respective judgments now at issue 
before this Court, Judge Iwasaki refused to reconsider Judge Daniels' prior order. Such 
refusal constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
At no time was any evidence of any kind ever offered in the trial court against Jeff 
Crosland as to the issue of damages. Accordingly, the trial court's award of damages 
against Jeff Crosland is erroneous and Jeff Crosland is entitled to a trial on the issue of 
damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TilE 1RIAL COURT ERRED IN HOlDING THAT A PERSON WHO 
EXECUTES A GUARANTY IN HIS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACTIY 
AS AN OFFICER OF TIIE CORPORATION IS PERSONALLY LIABLE 
ON TIIE GUARANTY 
As a threshold matter, Jeff Crosland notes that the trial court has held that at the 
time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty, CI had not been dissolved and was a de jure 
corporation. (R. at 549: 14-16). Therefore, the primary question on this appeal is 
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whether, under Utah law as it existed on January 8, 1988, a person who executes a 
guaranty in his representative capacity as an officer of a suspended corporation, but prior 
to dissolution, is personally liable under the guaranty.3 
A The Trial Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment Against 
Jeff Crosland Is Based Upon The Wrong Version Of Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10-882(1). 
The order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland is based upon the 
wrong version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1). At the time Judge Daniels entered 
summary judgment against Jeff Crosland, all parties and the trial court relied upon the 
following version of Utah Code Ann.§ 16-10-88.2(1) as the controlling statutory authority: 
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days after 
the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be 
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under 
Section 59-7-155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the 
corporation, unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation is already 
suspended for any reason. A corporation that is suspended continues its 
corporate existence and may carry on any business so long as it also takes 
the necessary steps to remedy its suspended status and restore the 
corporation to good standing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1) (as amended March 20, 1990)(emphasis added). 
However, the requirement, if it exists in the language of the statute, to take "necessary 
steps to remedy its suspended status and restore the corporation to good standing" was 
not passed by the Legislature until 1990, after the events at issue in this case. (See R. at 
432-34). The applicable version of§ 16-10-88.2(1) in effect at the time of the events 
3 As indicated, the trial court has held that CI had not dissolved and was a de jure corporation 
on January 8, 1988, the date upon which Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty. 
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subject of this litigation contained no requirement for a corporation to remedy its 
suspended status and in no way affected the de jure status of a corporation until 
dissolution.4 (See R. at 435-37). The notice of suspension under the old statute was 
simply a precursor to a later dissolution, which, at that time, would result in the 
corporation's loss of de jure statute. Yet in the case at bar, the trial court has determined 
that CI was, until the time of dissolution, a de jure corporation. (R. at 549:14-16). 
Because CI was a de jure corporation at the time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty 
in his representative capacity as vice president of CI, and the requirement of 
reinstatement from suspension, to protect corporate officers, directors and/or shareholders 
from creditors of the corporation did not exist, there was an error in law that the trial 
court was obligated to correct once the error was discovered. 
B. Principles Of Statutory Construction Make Clear That The 
1990 Amendment Operated To Change Existing Law. 
The Murphys argue, both to the trial court below and in their Reply to Brief of 
Appellee Todd Crosland ("Murphys Reply Brief'), that the 1990 amendment relied upon 
by Judge Daniels was merely a codification of the common law. See Murphys Reply Brief 
at 17. This contention ignores principles of statutory construction, is based on the false 
premise that "suspension" under the Utah Code operated to diminish the powers of a 
4The 1990 version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1) was repealed and replaced with the 
Revised Business Corporation Act after the accrual of the Murphys' claims. See Laws 1992, Ch. 
227 § 248, effective July 1. 1992. The present provisions appear in the Revised Business 
Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-101, et seq., effective July 1, 1992. The provisions 
in effect on January 8, 1988. however, govern this appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5. 
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corporation, and is an unsupported leap to the conclusion that corporate officers are 
personally liable for executing a corporate guaranty during the period of suspension. The 
Murphys' contentions fail on all counts. 
Under the law in effect at the time of the transaction in question in this case, there 
is no statutory provision requiring that a corporation take "the necessary steps to remedy 
its suspended status and restore the corporation to good standing" in order to carry on its 
business which appears in the amendment relied upon by Judge Daniels. (See R. at 435-
37). In interpreting such an amendment, the appropriate rule of construction is set forth 
in Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318 (1918). In Hirsh, the 
court concluded that a prior statute had no requirement for notice based upon an 
intervening amendment which added a requirement for service of notice. Id. at 319. The 
court concluded as follows: 
If service of notice had thus been required under the statute as it 
stood, it would have been a useless ceremony to have amended it. 
Clearly the legislative construction was that the old statute did not 
require notice, and therefore they amended it so that service of 
notice was required. 
I d. Likewise, here, there was no requirement of reinstatement of a suspended corporation 
in the applicable law. The legislature necessarily construed the statute the same way as 
is shown by their addition of that requirement in the 1990 amendment. "[I]t would have 
been a useless ceremony to have amended" the statute if the law already contained that 
requirement. See id. 
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This interpretation also is mandated by N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction ["Sutherland Statutory Construction"], which states: "[A]ny material change 
in the language of the original act is presumed to indicate a change in legal rights .... 
Thus, in interpreting an amendatory act there is a presumption of change in legal rights. 
This is a rule peculiar to amendments and other acts purporting to change the existing 
statutory law." Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 22.30 (4th ed. 1985 Rev.) (emphasis 
added). 
C. The Murphys' Argument As To The Effect Of Suspension Is 
Not Supported By Applicable Utah Law. 
In the Brief of Appellants, the Murphys rely upon Rocky Mountain Sales & 
Service, Inc. v. Havana RV, Inc., 635 P.2d 935 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), for the proposition 
that a Utah corporation under suspension cannot conduct business. That Colorado case 
relied upon Dominion Oil Co. v. Lamb, 201 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1948) (en bane). Dominion 
Oil Co. explains the basis for the Colorado decisions as relying upon a specific Colorado 
statute: 
Chapter 41, section 83, '35 C.S.A. Supp., provides that a corporation 
which fails to pay its annual corporation license taxes and other fees 
required by law, shall, after publication of a list of such corporations 
by the secretary of state and upon proof thereof being filed with such 
secretary, "be deemed defunct and inoperative and no longer 
competent to transact business within the state of Colorado * * * ." 
Id. at 374. No statute in Utah exists which mandates that a de jure corporation "be 
deemed defunct and inoperative and no longer competent to transact business within the 
state of' Utah upon a suspension under Section 16-10-88.2. Therefore, the Colorado cases 
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cited by plaintiffs are inapposite, as being based upon Colorado statutes which do not 
have Utah equivalents. 
The Murphys also rely upon 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations § 2825 (1986). See Brief 
of Appellants at 7. However, nothing in the portion relied upon by the Murphys would 
impose personal liability upon Jeff Crosland. In fact, the case relied upon by Am. Jur. 
for the phrase quoted by the Murphys does not stand for any proposition such as the one 
argued by the Murphys to this Court. Instead, where a corporation had entered into a 
contract during a period of suspension, and sought to enforce the contract during the time 
of suspension, the case relied upon by Am. Jur. stated as follows: 
We hold that, so long as its corporate powers are suspended, a 
corporation may not affirmatively enforce contracts which it entered 
into during the period when its powers were suspended. 
Kupski v. Bal Investment Co., 35 Mich. App. 680, 192 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1971). This is 
a far cry from imposing personal liability upon an officer of a de jure corporation, the 
proposition for which the Murphys argued the Am. Jur. quotation stands. 
Moreover, Murphys have failed to quote the next-following, but even more 
applicable sentence out of Am. Jur.: 
But the corporation may dispose of its property during this period. 
19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations§ 2825 (1986). In this case, the execution by the corporation 
of a guaranty constituted nothing more than a disposition of its property which it was able 
to do. The guaranty did nothing more and nothing less than pledge CI corporate assets 
to satisfy the loan obligation of Swenson upon a default by Swenson. This construction is 
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also supported by the case cited by Am. Jur., Furstenberg Bros. v. Township of Carrollton, 
61 Mich. App. 230, 232 N.W.2d 372 (1975). In Furstenberg Bros., defendants challenged 
the validity of an assignment agreement entered into by the suspended plaintiff-
corporation. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that an assignment amounted to 
nothing more than a disposition or conveyance of property as to which a suspended 
corporation is entitled to proceed. Plaintiffs fail to explain how the execution of a 
corporate guaranty, which does nothing more in substance than pledge the assets of the 
corporation to satisfy the indebtedness of the principal obligor, could be viewed any 
differently. 
In any event, the corporate suspensiOn statutes relied upon in Colorado and 
Michigan are not found in the applicable version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2. It is 
only after the 1990 amendment that the statute purports to require a reinstatement after 
a suspended status. During the applicable time period, as to the conduct of business, the 
only provision of Section 16-10-88.2 which addressed the issue of inability to conduct 
business arose after dissolution and stated: 
The dissolution of any corporation precludes that corporation from 
doing business in its corporate character under any name or assumed 
names filed on behalf of the dissolved corporation under Section 42-
2-5. 
(See R. at 437). The corporate status was not affected by a suspension under Section 16-
10-88.2, the notice of suspension did not set forth any effect of suspension, and the only 
effect of suspension under the statute was to provide notice that the corporation would 
15 
be dissolved one year from the date of mailing the notice of suspension unless the 
corporation removed the suspension before that time. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(2)( e). 
Further, while the Murphys cite to Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 
P.2d 163 (Utah 1977), for their proposition that a suspended corporation has no power 
and is incompetent to enter into valid contracts such as the one at issue in the case at bar, 
that citation is somewhat misleading. The holding of personal liability upon the defendant 
in Gillham Advertising Agency was not premised upon any notion of corporate suspension, 
but rather was premised upon the court's holding that "there was no such corporation of 
which [defendant] was president." Gillham Advertising Agency, 567 P.2d at 165. In other 
words, no de jure corporation existed. 
Nor is the Murphys' reliance on Section 16-10-139 well-placed. As was pointed out 
in the dissent in the Gillham Advertising Agency case, that provision is identical to 
Section 146 of the Model Business Corporations Act which "is designed to prohibit the 
application of any theory of de facto incorporation." Gillham Advertising Agency v. Ipson, 
567 P.2d 163, 165-66 (Utah 1977) (Maughn, J., dissenting). CI, even if suspended, 
remained a de jure corporation until dissolution, and thereafter while winding up. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1987 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1988). Further, a review of the 
Model Business Corporations Act discloses that that Act contains no provision for 
suspension such as existed under the applicable version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2. 
Moreover, CI was not a de facto corporation, such that Section 16-10-139 would have any 
application, but was a de jure corporation, as the trial court has so held. (See R. at 
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549:14-16). Having remained a de jure corporation until dissolution and winding up, there 
is no individual liability to be imposed on any person by virtue of the giving of a 
corporate guaranty. 
In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the authority of a corporate 
officer to act on behalf of the corporation "die[s] with the corporation." Houston v. Utah 
Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 P. 174 (1919). Thus, until the "death" 
of the corporation, by dissolution, a corporate officer is empowered to act on a 
corporation's behalf, at least under the applicable law. 
D. TilE 1RlAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
RECONSIDER JUDGE DANIELS' PRIOR ORDER 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59( a) allows a new trial or amendment of a judgment on grounds 
that the judgment is against law or was based on an error in law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(a)(6)-(7). Regardless of whether the Murphys are correct in their assertion that 
defendants first mistakenly argued the wrong law, none of the parties to this action nor 
the Court noted that the law argued had not become effective until 1990. Once it was 
discovered that Judge Daniels' prior order was based upon the wrong statutory provision, 
the trial court had a duty to reconsider that prior order and to correct the error of law 
that had been made. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(7). Failure to so do constitutes an abuse 
of discretion and is reversible error. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988). 
The law is the law. Neither defendants' nor plaintiffs' arguments concerning the 
law alters its existence or effect. Regardless of the arguments, Judge Daniels, in rendering 
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his decision against Jeff Crosland, relied upon a statute which was not in effect at the 
time of the transaction and therefore not applicable. The correct law appears in the 
Record at pages 435-37. Judge Daniels' decision against Jeff Crosland is clearly based 
upon an "error in law" as that phrase is used in Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7), because it is 
expressly premised upon law which did not exist at the time of the transaction in question. 
Moreover, Judge Iwasaki expressly held that CI was a de jure corporation, thus making 
it impossible for Jeff Crosland to be individually liable. Therefore, the trial court erred 
as a matter of law in failing to reconsider Judge Daniels' ruling. 
The Murphys' apparent argument that statutory law can be established between the 
parties to litigation by virtue of who makes the first argument is unsupported. Having 
disclosed an error in law, the trial court had the duty to examine that error to determine 
the entitlement of Jeff Crosland to an amendment of judgment or new trial. Failure to 
fulfill that duty is an abuse of discretion and constitutes reversible error. 
ID. 1HE TRIAL COURTS ENlRY OF DAMAGES AGAINST JEFF 
CROSLAND IS CLEAR ERROR WHERE NO EVIDENCE WAS EVER 
OFFERED AGAINST JEFF CROSLAND ON 1HE ISSUE OF 
DAMAGES 
There has never been one shred of evidence offered against Jeff Crosland on the 
issue of damages. Rather, the only basis upon which the trial court awarded an amount 
of damages was the default judgment which had been entered against CI in a separate 
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action to which Jeff Crosland was not a party.5 Yet the law is clear that the fact that 
the Murphys have taken a default judgment against the corporation does not entitle them 
to forego putting on proof of their damages as against Jeff Crosland, and clearly violates 
well-established notions of due process. See Tintic Indian Chief Mining & Milling Co. 
v. Clvdt.:, ;,, 
' ' 
portion of the judgment against Jcf;· Crosland rm~st .,,: :-eversed and remanded tot[ c tr~al 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Jeff Crosland should be 
reversed, and the trial court should be directed to enter an order dismissing, with 
prejudice, the Murphvs' claims against Jeff Crosland. Alternativelv. the damages oortion 
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